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British Defence Issues Are Far from Surface Deep or a 
Modern Phenomenon.  
 
 
British defence is never far from criticism and short-term analysis in recent years. However, 
the problems being experienced are far from the daily surface issues that encourage reactionary 
excitement from military thinkers, the media and commentators. The reality is that the 
problems across the full spectrum of British defence is not just the platitudes, nostalgia and 
lacklustre attitudes of politics and the British public towards defence expenditure but a far more 
profound and ingrained set of issues. These issues, problems and challenges, some rooted in 
centuries of debate, have been passed from one government and one generation to the next. 
Amplified by complex, varying influences and factors in the post Second World War 
environment are not entirely a surprise to anyone educated in the long and often controversial 
debate that has gripped British defence and strategic thinking in the past two centuries.  
Although this is often overlooked by the modern obsession with technobabble and the short-
sightedness of the keyboard warrior mob it indicates that these complex, long narrative issues 
are more than conveniently swept under the carpet and little understood. 
 
The narrative of British defence can be broken first and foremost into two clear segments, pre 
defence unification [the 1960s] and the service ministry era. Essentially anything covering the 
Second World War and before. The entanglement of issues from either of these phases is so 
complicated and intense, that although some claim that Britain has or has to move on from 
nostalgia they fail to grasp how integrated with century-old debates and issues defence is. The 
nightmare of anyone concerned about British defence is to understand that the modern 
politician or civil servant has neither the inclination or education or understand where, how 
and why these issues and problems come from let alone what they mean. Although modern 
defence maybe partially tempted to avoid being accused of running like a museum, since the 
creation of the U.K. Ministry of Defence one 'business as standard' ethos can be found; ‘well 
that’s how it’s always been done’ even if on the surface it appears change and reform as 
occurred. The cultural environment can easily outlast reform when there is a will to maintain 
it while at the same time smashing apart the value of some aspects of institutional coherence.  
Probably one of the most dangerous institutional cultures to exist in any defence establishment 
is to abuse knowledge of the past. The irony is to understand that to solve the future defence 
requires some study of the past, pre-Ministry of Defence. Although the service ministry’s of 
old such as the British Admiralty or War Office were not without faults and often institutionally 
became stuck in a certain way of thinking, but they were far from afraid of asking tough 
conceptual, theoretical and strategic questions that needed public airing. Although ‘jointness’ 
has come with great advantages in some regards the defence culture has often enhanced British 
cultural attitudes towards ‘not rocking the boat’ with anyone or anything. This has been useful 
to not only decision makers but some in the military who want to protect certain misplaced 
ideology or political methods. Long gone are the levers of change that those in defence had to 
change direction and this has resulted in the relative difficulties they now experience. All of 
this coming after multiple defence reforms and changes which as Admiral Chatfield warned in 
the late 1930s ‘will simply result in the treasury and politician having so much power that 
strategic driven and any sense of defence will be pointless where the Royal Navy will be barely 
effective or efficient and the rest of defence nothing more than useless’.  British influence has 
waned as it has reduced its hard power in favour for soft power where despite all attempts to 
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stop falling into the abyss of national irrelevancy, Britain’s new aircraft carriers are carrying 
the weight of what little hard impact and influence the nation possesses.  
 
For many the often call for a cash injection to defence would solve its problems all in one neat 
act, ensuring Tier 1 capabilities and compatibility with Britain’s closest ally, the United States. 
If only resolving British defence were that simple. It would be a functional starting block to 
increase spending to cover some strategically driven procurement plans, but British defence is 
probably as equally in need of more crash as it is a hard reboot. Instead, the British defence 
debate is a lot of noise, technobabble and keyboard warrior driven where finding quality 
strategic debate is rarely to be found. The British attitude to civility over and in defence rather 
than asking tough questions, all in the aid to avoid divisions has done little bar intensify hidden 
service rivalry and the influence of the treasury. Ploughing it further into the troubles that are 
now so sorely see visible.  
 
In the U.K. few want to debate strategy as it reopens the hardest two questions of all in Britain’s 
past, current and future defence policy; maritime [aka global] or continental and do they need 
three armed services? In reality, the latter question could be disregarded if all the services were 
to row in the same direction. The bitter century of debate between the Royal Air Force and 
Royal Navy could be ended if both were rowing to the same strategy. Elsewhere the British 
Army needs to stop pushing an obsession with being placed on the German Rhine or consistent 
conflict and war as the only way for the future. One strategy presented to the decision maker 
or treasury would probably result in a far leaner, efficient, effective and funded defence where 
few can match the British Armed Forces and its maritime focused strategy. Naval historian and 
theorist Julian Corbett was keen to remind the military in the First World War that the ultimate 
decision-makers did not need to know the ‘in’s and outs’ of it but that a strategy and plan were 
in place and history demonstrates confidence that it can work for Britain. This was the best 
tactic to get decision makers on board with the military advice and historical experience and 
for them to stop tinkering in the affairs of defence, which few of them understood and even 
less knew how to manage and budget.  British strategy when it had been highly successful in 
the centuries prior had been more about fighting around the edges, quality services and pin 
point application of strategy and tactics than messy involvement or presence in extended land 
and air campaigns.  Unfortunately, Corbett’s warnings would go unheeded, and the unification 
of defence purely resulted in more power to the treasury and centre.  Intelligent and scholarly 
thinking would be ejected from the orbit of decision makers to where the consistently revolving 
door of defence secretaries, treasury plans and joint doctrines was nothing more than a huge 
flag to welcome in two attitudes, the chaos of ‘doing nothing’ and defence budget ‘salami 
slicing’ which had little intellectual thought behind it and often resulting in British defence 
being caught off guard. You only have to look at events over the past thirty-five years that 
defence has become expensive because of the lack of debate and strategy and too many ‘near 
run things’.  Pushing off decisions, cutting superior capabilities and devaluing experience only 
for short-term political expediency has, in the end, cost future governments and defence more 
than if kept in the first place. Modern defence and unification on both sides of the Atlantic are 
commonly in short-term circles where power transferred to the centre has done nothing bar to 
harass the centre and military while stripping too much control from those who protect and 
provide insurance for long-term value and strategy.  
 
With global tensions rising and new and old challenges, for this would not be the first time in 
history that an array of problems are combined into what appears akin to decline into continual 
conflict and war, which has come with its own problems and issues, the British are again 
looking at defence.  U.S. Defence Secretary Mattis writing in June of 2018 to the British 
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defence secretary voicing his concerns over military expenditure and the outcome of U.K. 
Defence Modernising, it led to a foray of commentary where it appeared both the British Prime 
Minister and Treasury have not changed their approach to defence. It highlights again, that 
since the 1960s British defence has been about rearranging the deck chairs on a sinking ship 
while the hard choices and truth row away towards the setting sun.  
 
The permutation of rigidity, ‘strategyless’ and lacklustre defence debates of the past sixty years 
have come to a point where either events overtake the dialogue, or a strategic shock will hit the 
British so hard, Brexit aside, that they will have no choice but to fight and think on terms not 
defined of their own. This destroys centuries of British experience and strength where the sea, 
was used to stack the odds in British favour.  The U.K. having squandered what time they have 
had to reform defence and that the often-devoid study of their own and foreign history will 
inevitably and ultimately backfire on the British. British defence often acts like a self-created 
museum, where on the one hand they pretend to be modern and forward-looking but avoiding 
admitting they are deeply lost in the misinterpretation, misinformation and manipulation of old 
unanswered questions and debates. The similarities to history are startling and worrying many 
military thinkers, the late 1930s where the Royal Air Force was misconfigured, the British 
Army short on personnel and the Royal Navy lacked the investment to truly command the seas 
to protect Britain’s very survival. Today the situation is similar, the British nuclear deterrence 
has been a certain line of defence but often under threat from misguided thinking while the 
significantly depleted Royal Navy exists on the back of an increasingly shaky ‘can do attitude’ 
while the Army and Airforce have little operational stamina left within them.  
 
British defence has finally headed towards a crunch point where the build-up of 
underinvestment, the platitudes of niceties and the ejection of intellectual thought has broken 
the back of defence. Chaos may be a good thing if the past culture of conviction of the service 
ministries and previous chiefs of staff still existed to turn it into opportunity, but instead, Britain 
will probably find another carefully worded answer or delicately managed set of accountants 
push issues yet again in the future. How long can this be sustained is the question?  
 
Therefore the U.S. Defence Secretary is wholly correct to raise concerns, they are well placed 
and founded.  Early 20th century British Admiral and reformer John Fisher famously used the 
slogan ‘sack the lot’ for he had been on the end of seeing and experiencing the paralysis of 
indecision and the abandonment of strategy in favour of political expediency, service rivalry 
and treasury control. Perhaps today the best answer today is to do exactly what Fisher 
recommend: ‘sack the lot’ and reboot British defence with strategy first culture and an 
institutional policy where Britain ‘out thinks’ challenges rather than whatever the status quo in 
the U.K. MoD is or the direction of the political winds at the moment demands.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
James W.E. Smith is a PhD Researcher in the Department of War Studies, Kings College 
London and research fellow at the U.S. Naval War College.  
